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JURISDICTION? NATURE OF PROCEEDING

This is an appeal from a District Court judgment and order ,
granted in a divorce proceeding.

This Court has jurisdiction

over this case pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(g) (1953),
as amended •

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

1.

Does Michael Barker enjoy a special status as a "free

white male citizen de iure ," or any other status, such that the
District Court did not have jurisdiction over him, or such that
the laws of Utah do not apply to him?
2.

Is Michael Barker obligated to support his children and

to reimburse the State if, through the AFDC program, it does so
on his behalf?

In seeking such reimbursement from Michael

Barker, is the State entitled to discover information regarding
his income and assets?
3.

In the proceedings below, did Michael Barker properly

join those parties designated as "Non-Parties/Respondents" in the
List of Parties above (page ii)?
4.

Did the District Court properly dismiss Michael

Barker's "tort-like" claims against the Non-Parties?
5.

Was Michael Barker afforded due process of law in the

divorce proceedings?

-66.

Was the Mexican divorce entitled to be recognized as

valid and enforceable in Utah?

STATUTES WHQgfi INTERPRETATION Ig DETERMINATIVE

All of the statutes cited above have bearing in this case,
but the following statutes are the most significant and
determinative:
Utah Code Ann. §78-45-3 (1953), as amended:
Every man shall support his child . • . .
Utah Code Ann. §78-45-9 (1953)/ as amended:
. . . The state department of social services
may proceed pursuant to this act or any other
applicable statute, either on its own behalf
or on behalf of the obligee, to enforce the
obligee's right of support against the obligor. . . •
Utah Code Ann. §78-45b-3 (1953)/ as amended:
(c) If assistance is furnished by the
department . . . the department is the trustee
of any cause of action or claims of the obligee
or any minor child in that obligee's custody/
to recover support due to the obligee from
any person.
(d) The department may bring and maintain the
action either in its own name or in the name
of the obligee.
Utah Code Ann. §78-45b-2(8) (1953)/ as amended:
"Obligor" means any person owing a duty of support.

STATEMENT QF TSE CASE

This is an action for divorce/ filed by Laura Beth Barker
against Michael Robert Barker. (R. 11-21).

The State was named

-7as a co-plaintiff because Mrs. Barker was receiving public
assistance for the parties' minor children/ and the State desired
an order requiring Mr. Barker to reimburse it for that public
assistance.

(R. 16).

Mr. Barker then filed an Answer/ and subsequent pleadings/
in which he named various persons and entities as additional
parties plaintiff.

(R. 22/ 24/ 37/ 38/ 39). These are the

persons designated herein as Non-Parties/Respondents.

They

consist of the Office of Recovery Services/ various State
officials/ Utah Legal Services/ Inc./ and various persons either
currently or previously working for Utah Legal Services/ Inc.
Mr. Barker added these Non-Parties to his pleadings without ever
making a motion to join them as parties.
At trial/ the court entertained motions by the State's
attorney and Mrs. Barker's attorney to dismiss the action as to
the Non-Parties/ on the grounds that the Non-Parties had never
been properly joined as parties/ and that Mr. Barker had failed
to state a cause of action against any of them.
granted those motions/ on those grounds.

The court

(Trial Transcript/ page

33). The court did provide Mr. Barker an opportunity to present
evidence at trial regarding claims he said he had against the
State Department of Social Services.

(Trial Transcript/ page

40) .
The court then heard the evidence and arguments of the
parties and granted the divorce.
217).

It denied Mr. Barker's claims for relief against the

Department of Social Services.
216) .

(Trial Transcript/ pages 20 9-

(Trial Transcript/ pages 215-

-8Mr. Barker then appealed the decision of the trial court.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

(Unless stated otherwise/ all references in this brief to
the Transcript are to the Trial Transcript.)
Facts relating to the divorce in general;

The State

incorporates herein by reference the Statement of Facts found on
pages 8 through 12 of the brief of Mrs. Barker.

Facts relating to the State's collection of child support
from Mr . Barker 2

The State incorporates herein by reference

said Statement of Facts from Mrs. Barker's brief/ and also
submits the following additional facts.
At the time of the trial/ Mrs. Barker had been on public
assistance since January 1985.

(Transcript/ page 63). The State

had claims against Mr. Barker in the amount of $1/7 46.0 0 for
reimbursement of public assistance provided for his children.
(Transcript/ page 134). The claims of the State against Mr.
Barker/ as raised in the Amended Complaint/ essentially consist
of the following: (1) a claim that defendant be ordered to pay
ongoing support for his children/ and that such payments be made
through the Office of Recovery Services as long as Mrs. Barker
receives public assistance for them; (2) a claim for judgment
against Mr. Barker for reimbursement of past public assistance
provided the children; and (3) a request for mandatory income
withholding as provided by Utah statute.

(R. 16/ 9-10)•

-9Prior to the judicial establishment of Mr* Barker's child
support obligation by the District Court/ the State Office of
Recovery Services had been engaged in efforts to administratively
establish the defendant's child support obligation and to collect
such support from him.

In connection therewith, the Office of

Recovery Services had taken steps to discover financial
information regarding Mr. Barker.

Among other things# the State

had contacted Mr. Barker's employer to verify wage information.
(Transcript/ pages 131-144).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

This is a divorce case in which the wife has been a
recipient of State AFDC assistance for the children.

The State

of Utah joined as a party in order to obtain appropriate
reimbursement of such assistance from the husband.
Prior to the commencement of the subject divorce
proceedings/ the husband obtained a Mexican divorce.

(He was not

a resident of Mexico/ nor did he travel to Mexico to obtain the
Mexican divorce.)

The District Court properly held that the

Mexican divorce was not entitled to be recognized in Utah.
The husband claims a special legal status which he says
prevents the courts of Utah from having jurisdiction over him.
He also claims special rights because of such status/ and he
claims that certain Utah laws do not apply to him because of such
status.

All of his claims of special status are without merit.

-10After the husband was served with the summons and complaint
in this case f he filed pleadings purporting to join as parties
various additional persons/ including State officials/ State
attorneys/ and his wife's attorneys.
claims against those persons.

He made certain "tort-like"

He failed to follow proper

procedures for joining any additional parties/ nor did he
properly state any claims against them or against the Department
of Social Services.

The trial judge properly dismissed those

extraneous claims against those persons/ and against the
Department of Social Services.
The defendant was afforded due process of law in the
proceedings before the District Court/ and his appeal should be
dismissed.

ARGUMENT

PRELIMINARY NOTE: Pursuant to Rule 2 4(i) of the Rules of the Utah
Court of Appeals/ the State incorporates herein by reference the
brief of respondent Laura Barker/ in its entirety.

I-

Defendant/Appellant Michael R. Barker is subject to the

lurisdiction of the courts of Utah, and he is also subject to the

laws of Utah*

Appellant Michael R. Barker claims that he enjoys a special
status which he describes as a "free/ white sovereign citizen (de
jure) of the State of Utah."

He alleges that/ because of his

-11alleged special status, the District Court lacked jurisdiction
over him.
At trial/ Mr. Barker claimed that the legal authorities
cited by the plaintiffs in arguments before the court "do not
apply" to him# because he claims to be a "sovereign status
person."

(Transcript/ page 25). He claimed that he is de jure

person/ and that the judge and the opposing parties are de facto
persons.

(Transcript/ page 27). He said that MrSf Barker has

"civil rights under the 14th Amendment/" whereas h&. has
"sovereign rights."

(Transcript/ page 26). He stated that "on

the basis of maritime equity/" he is not an "obligor/" and he
tried to use this as a defense to the State's claims for
reimbursement of public assistance provided for his children.
(Transcript/ page 2 5.)
Mr. Barker's claim that he has a special status which
somehow excuses him from being subject to the jurisdiction of the
District Court is wholly without merit.

The Utah Supreme Court

summarily rejected similar "special status" arguments in City of

Salina v . Wisden. 737 P.2d 981 (Utah 1987).

In that c a s e , the

court stated:
In order for our scheme of ordered liberties
to succeed/ we must all obey valid lawsf even
those with which we do not agree; a man
cannot exempt himself from the operation
of a law simply by declaring that he does
not consent to have it apply to him.
City of Salina v. Wisden, at p. 983.

Mr. Barker's belief t h a t he i s a "free white sovereign c i t i z e n dja.
j u r e " does not prevent the Courts of Utah/ including the Sixth
D i s t r i c t Court/ from exercising j u r i s d i c t i o n over him and

-12granting the orders which were rendered below.

Nor does his said

belief prevent the laws of Utah from applying to him, including
those laws which hold him responsible for the support of his
children.

The trial court acted properly in determining that the

defendant has no special rights# above and beyond those of any
other citizen.

(Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, page

18) .

!!•

Defendant/Appellant Michael Barker has an obligation to

support his children and to reimburse the State for public
assistance provided for those children*

The State is entitled to

discover financial information pertaining to the defendant in
connection with the establishment and enforcement of his support

obligations*

Utah statutes and case law make it abundantly clear that
every man has an obligation to support his children.

§7 8-45-3,

Utah Code Annotated/ 1953/ as amended; Rees v» Archibald. 311
P.2d 788 (Utah 1957).

(All statutory citations herein are to

Utah Code Annotated/ 1953/ as amended/ unless otherwise stated.)
Mr. Barker is the undisputed father of the children in this case.
Therefore/ he has a legal duty to support them.

Because he has a

duty to support these children/ he is/ by definition/ an
"obligor" under both the Uniform Civil Liability for Support Act
(§78-45-2(2)) and the Public Support of Children Act (§78-45b2(8)).

A parent does not have to behind in his child support

payments to be an "obligor."
support/ he is an obligor.

As long as he has children to

-13Utah law also makes it clear that when the State* from
public funds* provides aid to families with dependent children
(AFDC) * the State is entitled to seek reimbursement of that aid
from parents ("obligors") having support obligations respecting
those children.

§78-45-9; §78-45b-l.l; §78-45b-3.

When a court

order is in effect establishing the amount of the obligor's child
support obligation* then that order governs.

§78-45-7(1); §78-

45b-4; Larsen v. Larsen, 561 P.2d 1077 (Utah 1977).
When no court order is in effect (as was the case here prior
to the entry of the orders below) the law requires that various
circumstances be taken into consideration in determining the
appropriate amount of reimbursement for prior periods* and
prospective support for future periods.

§78-45-7; §78-45b-6(2).

In determining the appropriate amount of reimbursement for prior
periods* the courts must consider/ among other things* "the
amount of public assistance received by the obligee."

§78-45-

7(3) .
The legislature has commissioned the Office of Recovery
Services (ORS) with the responsibility for collecting such
reimbursement of public moneys from child support obligors.
15c-4.

§55-

In the fulfillment of its duties* ORS is entitled to

discover information regarding the income and employment of
obligors.

Such information is extremely relevant to the

determination of a child support obligation* and constitutes
important evidence which ORS is entitled to discover.
3(8).

§78-45b-

-14Appellant Michael Barker claims that the ORS violated his
privacy when it contacted his employer to verify employment and
to obtain wage information pertaining to him.

He also states

that one of his reasons for claiming that such contact with the
employer was improper is that "there was no default judgment
against Defendant. . . ."

(Appellant's Brief/ page 17). He

claims that ORSfs attempts to discover financial information
about him did not constitute an "official investigation" under
§78-27-50/ and that the contact with his employer was improper.
Mr. Barker essentially seems to be saying that the Office of
Recovery Services must/ without independent inquiry/ accept as
truthful the representations of child support obligors regarding
their financial situation.

These contentions are without merit.

First# the constitutional provisions cited by Mr. Barker in
Point 5/ pages 17 to 21 of his brief/ are those which bar
unreasonable searches and seizures/ and the deprivation of life/
liberty or property without due process of law.

The State

submits that the contacting of Mr. Barker's employer to obtain
important/ relevant information was totally reasonable/
consistent with the Constitution and permissible under Utah
statutes.
Second/ as mentioned above/ ORS is entitled/ under §78-45b3(8)/ to gather such evidence. That section gives ORS general
authorization to gather information in the performance of its
duties under the Public Support of Children Act.

It is not

necessary that the inquiry be part of an official investigation.
When the State is proceeding under §78-27-50/ which deals with

-15discovering information from financial institutions/ the statute
makes it clear than any official investigation by ORS is exempt
from the requirements of financial information privacy.

The

State submits that when the Office of Recovery Services/ as part
of its statutory mandate/ is attempting to obtain relevant
information necessary to establish and enforce child support
obligations owed by an absent parent/ it is involved in an
official investigation.

Whichever statute ORS was proceeding

under in this case/ its contact with Mr. Barker's employer was
appropriate and reasonable.
Third/ Mr. Barker's apparent claim that the State was not
entitled to contact his employer because there was no default
judgment against him# makes no sense.

The statutes cited above

clearly allow ORS to discover such evidence/ and there is no
requirement that a default judgment be in place before such
evidence may be discovered.
Finally/ the testimony at the trial provides an excellent
illustration of one of the main reasons why it was necessary for
the legislature to allow ORS to discover such financial
information about child support obligors.

Waine Riches / Mrs.

Barker's attorney/ was examining Mr. Barker regarding his
employment and income:
Q

Are you currently employed?

A
I object to the question.
right to privacy.

It violates my

THE COURT
Your objection is overruled.
Answer the question.
MR. BARKER

Your Honor/ I am objecting.

-16THE COURT
overruled.
MR. BARKER

I said your objection is
Answer the question*
Sir, I don't want to argue.

THE COURT
Well, I don't want to put you
in jail. I've just instructed you to answer
the question. The question was: "Are you
employed?" That's a very simple question.
MR. BARKER
Again, I am basing my rights
issue on the fact that I am not a juristic
person, that I am de iures status.
THE COURT
And I am telling you I don't care
whether you are or you aren't a person like you
are saying. I am saying you will answer the
question or I'll hold you in contempt. . • .
I don't want to argue with you. I'm just saying
answer the question.
MR. BARKER

What was the question?

MR. RICHES

Are you presently employed?

A

Yes

Q

Where?

A

St. George Mining

Q

What is your gross pay per month?

A

Why do you want to know that information?

THE COURT
He is asking you a question.
answer the question. You don't ask him.

You

MR. BARKER
Your Honor, I think I'm going to have
to go to jail.
THE COURT
Then you might be. . . . Will you
please answer the question, what the gross pay is.
A
I am not sure what the gross pay is. I would
have to look at the records. (Transcript, pages 121
to 122) .
The testimony continues with obvious evasions on the part of
the witness to conceal his true income.

His statements to the

-17effect that he could not say what his income was without "looking
at his records/" are simply not credible.

Obviously# relying on

such testimony of a child support obligor# without being able to
independently verify his incomer would hamstring the State in its
attempts to pursue reimbursement of AFDC funds expended on behalf
of the obligor's children.
The State was and is entitled to look to Mr . Barker for
reimbursement of public moneys provided for his children t and to
obtain independent verification of his employment and income.
The order of the court respecting the Mr. Barker's child support
obligations took all proper factors into consideration and was
fair and reasonable/ and is entitled to be affirmed.

III. The "Non-Parties/Respondents" were not properly Joined
in this case, and the District Court acted properly in dismissing
Appellant's claims against them.

When a party defendant/ such as Mr. Barker/ desires to
litigate claims of his own in the lawsuit/ he has four possible
options.

First/ if he has claims against an existing plaintiff,

he may file a counterclaim/ following the procedures set forth in
Rule 13/ Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

Second/ if he has claims

against another existing defendant, he may file a cross-claim/
pursuant to the same rule.
sole defendant.)

(In this case/ the Mr. Barker is the

Third/ if he feels that some third party would

be liable for the things that the plaintiff is asserting against
him/ then he may file a third-party complaint/ following the
procedures set forth in Rule 14/ Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

-18Finally# if the defendant feels that he has some claims which
ought to litigated in the original proceeding/ but which cannot
be brought as a counterclaim/ cross-claim/ or third-party
complaint/ then he must make a proper motion for joinder and
obtain leave of court to bring the additional parties in.

Rule

21/ Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
These four options are the only ways a defendant can bring
additional parties into the lawsuit.

Unless he proceeds under

one of those options he may not accomplish a joinder by simply
typing the names of additional parties in the caption of the
complaint and sending pleadings to them.

To permit such a

procedure would deny those additional parties the due process of
law.
Appellant Michael Barker never properly joined the NonParties in this action/ and the record so shows.

Instead/

without proper authority/ he added the names of numerous other
persons—State officials/ opposing attorneys/ and so forth—that
he felt had done things he didn't likef and raised claims against
them as part of these divorce proceedings.
The District Judge properly dismissed Mr. Barker's claims
against the Non-Parties on the grounds that they were not
properly joined.

(Transcript/ page 33).

iv. Appellant's "tort-like" claims against the "NonParties/Respondents" and against the State Department of Social

Services were properly dismissed because they were not proper to
raise in a divorce proceeding, and because they failed to state a
claim upon which relief could be granted.
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Even if appellant Michael Barker had properly joined the
Non-Parties/ he failed to state claims against them upon which
the District Court could grant relief, and the court properly
dismissed his claims against them on that ground as well.

The

same applies to his claims against the Department of Social
Services.
First/ Mr. Barker's claims against the Non-Parties and the
Department of Social Services were in the nature of tort claims
and were not properly raised in these divorce proceedings.

The

State incorporporates herein by reference Point III on pages 18
and 19 of Mrs. Barker's brief/ which covers that point.
Second/ Mr. Barker's claims against the Non-Parties and the
Department of Social Services arise out the activities they
regularly and properly engage in as part of their employment/
which activities are not actionable/ no matter how much Mr.
Barker doesn't like them.

For example/ he claims that the State

is involved in trying to collect child support from him.
true/ but it is not actionable.
which Utah law requires be done.

This is

To the contrary/ it is something
Mr. Barker may not like it/ and

he may think that he has a special status which exempts him from
the application of laws that apply to society in general.

But

that does not give him a cause of action on that point.
Another example is Mr. Barker's claim that Ross Blackham/
the County Attorney/ did not file criminal charges against Mrs.
Barker as the result of an incident in which Mrs. Barker
allegedly assaulted Mr. Barker.

When Mr. Barker learned that the

-20County Attorney had decided not to charge his wife # he then asked
the Attorney General's Office to intercede.

The Attorney

General's Office, after reviewing the matter/ decided not to
override the discretion which the County Attorney had exercised.
Mr. Barker complains of these things.

Even if true/ however/

these facts do not give Mr. Barker a cause of action against any
Non-Party or against the Department of Social Services.

It is

well established that prosecuting authorities have discretion to
file criminal charges/ or not to file charges/ as they deem
appropriate after reviewing the facts.
P.2d 602 (Utah 1976).

State v. Hoffman, 558

The County Attorney and the Attorney

General were in the proper fulfillment of their duties in dealing
with Mr. Barker's criminal complaint as they did.
The myriad other matters raised by Mr. Barker against the
Non-Parties and the Department of Social Services are of a
similar vein/ and they all fail to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted.

The District Court acted properly in

dismissing them.

v.

tUchael Barker ^fts afforded due process of law in the

proceedings before the District Court,

Mr. Barker's brief makes repeated assertions that he was
denied due process in the trial of this matter.

Those assertions

are wholly without merit.
In plain terms/ and with all due respect to Mr. Barker/ the
situation is this:

Mr. Barker is not trained in the law.

-21Although he has submitted voluminous paperwork to the court and
the other parties which has contained many legal-sounding terms,
he does not know enough about the law, and legal procedures, to
evaluate whether or not a particular point has legal merit.

He

seems to have the idea that if he disagrees with a particular
action, such action is wrong and violates his due process rights
and various other rights.

However, as was stated above in the

language quoted from City of Salina v» Wisden. it is the duty of
every person to obey the law—even those laws with which they
disagree .
Accordingly, the fact that Mr. Barker may not like what has
happened in these proceedings does not render them erroneous.
Obviously he has been frustrated in his "game plan."

He has done

every imaginable thing to avoid submitting this divorce
proceeding to the District Court for a proper determination—
probably because he wants to avoid the child support and other
obligations that the court would impose.

For instance, he

obtained a Mexican divorce, which, coincidentally, does not
require Mr. Barker to pay child support for his children.

He has

also "rescinded [his] marriage contract to eliminate a nexus
between [himself] and the State" in an attempt to say that Utah
laws do not apply to him.

(Transcript, page 172). He apparently

feels that because the District Court found that those steps did
not dissolve his marriage to Mrs. Barker, the court denied him
due process of law.
It is appropriate to briefly treat some specific items which
Mr. Barker apparently feels denied him due process:

-22A.
jury.

Mr. Barker claims he was denied a right to trial by
It is clear that under Utah law, a divorce action is

equitable in nature and that there is no right to a jury trial.
24 Am Jur 2d 410, Divorce & Separation §342; §30-3-4, Utah Code
Ann. (1953), as amended; Lord v, Shaw. 665 P.2d 1288 (Utah 1983).
B.

Mr. Barker claims he was denied the right to counsel of

his choice.

This is incorrect.

At the pretrial hearing on

January 2, 1987, the court told Mr. Barker that he could have
counsel of choice—but the court also made it abundantly clear
that such counsel would have to be an attorney.

(Transcript of

Pretrial Hearing, page 5, lines 15-17, and pages 6-7). Then, at
trial, Mr. Barker attempted to have a non-lawyer act as his
lawyer.

(Trial Transcript, pages 5-6.

The judge properly

directed such non-lawyer to take his seat behind the bar, and not
to act as Mr. Barker's attorney.
C.
set.

§78-51-25.

Mr. Barker claims the District Court was not properly

His argument on this point is not clear, but it appears he

claims that it was a violation of the separation of powers
doctrine for the District Court to hear the divorce case, when
one of his theories was that he had rescinded his marriage
license.

Contrary to what Mr. Barker alleges in his brief, the

court did allow him to explain his separation of powers argument.
(Transcript, pages 37-38).

The court simply disagreed with Mr.

Barker, and found that it did in fact have jurisdiction in the
case and that it was properly sitting.

(Transcript, pages 3 7-

38) . It is well established that the District Courts are courts
of general jurisdiction, and that they are authorized to hear

-23divorce matters.
§78-3-4.

Utah Constitutionf Article VIII, Section 5;

The fact that Mr. Barker was proceeding under the

theory that he had "rescinded" his Utah marriage license did not
in any way detract from the authority of the District Court to
resolve that issue.
D.

Mr. Barker claims the court erred in threatening him

with incarceration when he refused to answer questions about his
finances.

This was not error; a court has the power to hold a

witness in contempt for failing to answer lawful questions (which
these were) after being ordered to do so, and to incarcerate the
witness in connection with that contempt.

§78-32-1; §78-32-3;

§78-32-10.
E.

Mr. Barker claims the court erred in denying him the

right to ask certain questions of witnesses.

Any limitations

placed on the scope of Mr. Barker's questions or testimony were
essentially on grounds of irrelevancy.

For example/ Mr. Barker

tried to ask the County Attorney why he did not file criminal
charges against Mrs. Barker for assault and battery.

That

question was objected to on grounds of irrelevancy/ and the
objection was sustained/ and properly so f since the question of
the County Attorney's handling of Mr. Barker's assault and
battery claim was not in issue and had nothing to do with the
divorce proceedings pending before the court.

(Transcript/ page

157) . A litigant is not entitled to use the courts as a forum to
ask questions of parties which are irrelevant to the matters at
hand/ and it is not a denial of due process for the court to so
order.
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advice."

Mr* Barker claims the court erred in "giving him legal
All the judge did was recommend that Mr. Barker retain

an attorney to represent him.

This was good advice and there was

nothing wrong with the judge giving it.
G.

Mr. Barker claims the court was a party to a conspiracy

because it failed to accept his claims that he, Mr. Barker, was
the victim of a conspiracy.

Such a claim is an affront to the

court/ and is totally ridiculous.

It is well established that a

trial judge is responsible for weighing the evidence presented at
trial/ and assigning such weight to different items of evidence
as he deems appropriate/ taking into consideration such things as
the credibility of witnesses.

The court was not obliged to

accept Mr. Barker's claims of conspiracy and/ by not accepting
those claims/ did not become a party to a conspiracy.

vi.

The court properly ruled that the Mexican Divorce w»§

not entitled to be recognised as valid and enforceable in Utah*

The State incorporates herein the arguments in Mrs. Barker's
brief which deal with this issue.

It also points out that the

court did receive evidence that neither Mr. or Mrs. Barker had
been to Mexico during the five years preceding the trial.
(Transcript/ page 104). The court properly found that the
Mexican divorce should not be recognized in Utah.

CONCLUSION

-25The State respectfully asks that appellant Michael Barker's
appeal be dismissed in its entirety and that he take nothing
thereby.
Pursuant to Rule 33(a) of the Rules of the Utah Court of
Appeals^ the State also asks for an award of reasonable
attorney's fees and double costs against Michael Barker. This
appeal, at least with regard to those issues involving the State,
is totally frivolous.
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